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COMMENTS
HAYDEN-CARTWRIGHT: A READY REMEDY FOR
OKLAHOMA'S INDIAN FUEL TAX WOES
I. INTRODUCrION
"The Oklahoma transportation infrastructure is close to a crisis .... In-
vestment in transportation infrastructure is the key link to economic devel-
opment .... .
In a decision that "could cost [Oklahoma] and other states hundreds of
millions of dollars,"2 the United States Supreme Court declined to consider
whether Congress has specifically granted States the power to tax motor fuels
bought by an Indian tribe for resale in Indian territory.4 This article argues that
the Supreme Court has two primary reasons ultimately to decide that Congress
has done so through the Hayden-Cartwright Act.' First, the legislative history
of the Act reveals that it was Congress' intent to permit such taxation. Second,
failure to allow the States such power would threaten the ability of states to
1. Brian Ford, Motorists' Fees Said Diverted from Roads by State, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 29, 1995, at
A24 (quoting Stephen Lalli, Executive Director, Oklahoma Good Roads and Streets Association).
2. Rob Martindale, Decision Creates "Different Ball Game," TULSA WORLD, June 15, 1995, at NI
(quoting Phillip Chisholm, Executive Director, Petroleum Marketers Association of America).
3. In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 n.16 (1980), the Court cursorily
stated that the Hayden-Cartwright Act "was not designed to overcome the otherwise pre-emptive effect of
federal regulation of tribal timber." The Court said, "[w]e need not reach the more general question whether
the Hayden-Cartwright Act applies to Indian reservations at all." Id. See also, Herzog Bros. Trucking, Inc. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 508 N.E.2d 914 (N.Y., 1987) (finding federal law pre-empted regulations), vacated and
remanded, 487 U.S. 1212 (1988), on remand 533 N.E.2d 255 (1988), where a motor fuel wholesaler argued
that New York could not impose its state motor fuel taxes on him because he sold only to Indian retailers on
a reservation. Rather than pick up Hayden-Cartwright, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsid-
eration under proposed regulations adopted by the state tax commission.
4. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214,2219 (1995). Justice Ginsburg stated
that "even though the Court of Appeals flagged the Act's possible relevance [footnote omitted], Oklahoma did
not mention this 1936 legislation in its petition for certiorari." Id. In Herzog Bros., 487 U.S. 1212, the Solici-
tor General suggested, to no avail, that the case be remanded to consider the applicability of Hayden-
Cartwright, "A remand to the court of appeals also would allow that court to consider the extent, if any, to
which the Hayden-Cartwright Act applies to sales of motor fuel to Indians or non-Indians on Indian reserva-
tions .... " Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16 n.10, State Tax Commission of New York v.
Herzog Bros. Trucking, Inc., 487 U.S. 1212 (1988) (No. 87-382).
Congressional power to regulate tribal affairs has been taken as given: "Congress has broad power to
regulate tribal affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U.S. 136, 142 (1980) (citing Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3).
5. 4 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1994). The State of Washington has taken this position. Fronda Woods (Assis-
tant Attorney General, Washington State), Indian Issues Concerning Highway User Taxes (September 13,
1994) (unpublished manuscript, copy on file with author).
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provide adequate transportation infrastructures for their populations,6 and thus
would stifle economic development. In the alternative, Congress should reaffirm
its commitment to the federal relationship between states and the national gov-
ernment by reaffirming states' power to tax fuel retailers regardless of ethnic
heritage of the landowner.
To understand why Hayden-Cartwright is so important to Oklahoma re-
quires some background information. That background first discusses Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation,7 the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion which underscored the need to look thoroughly at the Hayden-Cartwright
Act. Second, the background explains that the Act's roots reach deep into the
history of American highway funding. After this background, the author argues
that those roots are strong enough to support state taxation of motor fuels
bought by an Indian tribe for resale in Indian territory.
II. HIGH NOON FOR A FUEL TAX SHOWDOWN
The Oklahoma legislature imposes a tax "'upon the sale of each and every
gallon' of gasoline and diesel fuel sold within the State."' Before this past leg-
islative session ended, Oklahoma law required the fuel distributors to act as
"agent[s] of the state for the collection of the excise tax."9 As such, the statutes
required distributors to "pay the tax due on each gallon of fuel sold to retailers
or others in Oklahoma."'0 The Oklahoma legislature carved out an exemption
for fuel tribes purchased for their own vehicles."
The tax is an important source of revenue for Oklahoma.'" Of the $320
million it raises annually," over 70% of this revenue goes to the State Trans-
portation Fund to construct highways; counties and municipalities use most of
the remainder to maintain roads.'
4
The Chickasaw Nation, one of 554 federally recognized Indian tribes,'"
purchases motor fuels from non-Indians and resells them to any consumer,
whether a tribal member or not. It does so at tribal-owned and operated conve-
6. "Because of Oklahoma's current 'donor' state status relating to its receipt of federal transportation
funds, I have serious concerns regarding Oklahoma's future ability to finance its state highways, and the bear-
ing the decision has on the state petroleum marketing industry." Letter from U.S. Representative Steve
Largent to author (October 24, 1995) (on file with author). Oklahoma State Representative James Hamilton
has said the decision will "have a severe crippling effect on not only the construction of new roads but main-
tenance of the current system." Mick Hinton, State Fears Loss of Tax on Indian Gas, DAILY OKLAHOMAN,
Jan. 3, 1995, at 1.
7. 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995).
8. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, §§ 502, 502.1 (1992).
9. Id.
10. Brief of Petitioner at 2, Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995) (No,
94-771) [hereinafter Brief of Petitioner] (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 506 (1992)).
11. See id. at 4-5.
12. See id. at 3.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. See Tribe to Build New Jersey Casino, TULSA WoRLD, Aug. 15, 1995, at N8 (quoting U.S. Bureau
of Indian Affairs spokesman Thomas Sweeney).
[Vol. 32:139
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nience stores 6 that are located on lands which the United States holds in trust
for the Tribe. 7 Those fuels are "used almost exclusively off of Indian country
on State jurisdiction roads."'" Furthermore, "the Tribe does not construct or
maintain roads and highways for the use of the general public in Oklahoma...




Despite these sales and the statutory mandate to "collect taxes," the Chick-
asaw Tribe decided, on tribal sovereignty grounds, not to collect state fuel taxes
from anyone.' As a result, it was able to sell fuel to consumers well below
the minimum cost other retailers could charge.2'
The failure of the Chickasaw and other tribes to collect and remit these tax
revenues has had two immediate consequences for other Oklahomans: it has
constricted the amount of money the state has to maintain highways, and sec-
ondly as a result, "the state loses federal matching funds for road improve-
ments."
The Chickasaw Nation sued the State of Oklahoma in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, challenging the State's
authority to impose certain taxes upon the tribe and its members On cross
motions for summary judgment, Judge Frank Seay held that the State could tax
16. See Brief of Respondent at 7, Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995)
[hereinafter Brief of Respondent).
17. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 4. Title 25 of the United States Code, Section 465, grants
the Secretary of the Interior the power to acquire lands to be held in trust for Indians:
The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to acquire... any interest in
lands ... within or without existing reservations... for the purpose of providing land for Indians.
Title to any lands or rights acquired... shall be taken in the name of the United States in trust for
the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is acquired, and such lands or rights shall be
exempt from State and local taxation.
25 U.S.C. § 465 (1994). This power is not beyond question. See infra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
Recent Oklahoma trust holdings include 17,718 acres (Cherokee), 96,309 acres (Chickasaw), 144,402
acres (Choctaw), 4,061 acres (Creek), 35,763 acres (Seminole), and 217,639 acres (Osage). Kirke Kickingbird,
"Way Down Yonder in the Indian Nations, Rode My Pony Cross the Reservation!" from Oklahoma Hills by
Woody Guthrie, 29 TULSA LJ. 303, 324 n.91 (citing G. HALL, THE FEDERAL INDIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP
91 (1981)).
18. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 5 (quoting factual stipulation accepted by United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma).
19. Id.
20. See Chickasaw Nation v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 31 F.3d 964, 966
(10th Cir. 1994) (quoting parties' stipulations to trial court), rev'd in part, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995). In the past,
"Indian tribes paid motor fuel taxes without ill effect for many years." Bob Vandewater, Some Tribes Charge
Own Gas Tax State Fears Growing Loss of Revenue, SUNDAY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 20, 1995, at 1 (quoting
Oklahoma Tax Commission attorney David Miley). The tribe still paid federal fuel taxes.
21. Oklahoma State Transportation Secretary Neal McCaleb, himself a Chickasaw, has been reported to
indicate that "many of the tribes sell fuel cheaper than other competitors, thereby creating an unfair advan-
tage." Manny Gamalo, Tribal Tobacco, Fuel Mixture Ignites, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 1, 1995 at A3. See also
Bob Vandewater, Some Tribes Charge Own Gas Tax State Fears Growing Loss of Revenue, SUNDAY OKLA-
HOMAN, Aug. 20, 1995, at 1. While the tribe has been able to charge lower prices, it has not chosen to do so
on a large scale. Rather, it has applied its own tribal tax and used the proceeds for tribal activities.
22. "Mhe state [of Oklahoma] is losing $800,000 a month in potential federal aid because of the tax
loss to tribal fuel sales." Gamallo, supra note 21, at 3 (quoting Transportation Secretary McCaleb).
23. See Chickasaw, 31 F.3d at 966.
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fuel sales by the Tribe and its members.24 In doing so, he rejected the Tribe's
contention that the tax was "void as a direct tax[] on the Tribe."'25
The Tenth Circuit reversed on this issue. 6 It held that the State could not
apply the motor fuels tax to fuel sold by the Tribe's retail stores.2' Writing for
the Court of Appeals, Judge Monroe McKay found two faults in Judge Seay's
reasoning.' First, "the district court substituted economic assumptions for the
language of the statutes" when it concluded "that the taxes were passed on
through the retail price to the consumer... ",29 Because the statute does not
specifically state that the amount of tax must be "included in the retail price at
the pump," the Court of Appeals refused to recognize the legal incidence of the
tax to be on the consumer." This was true even though the economic inci-
dence fell on the consumer.
The appellate court also said that Judge Seay erred by concluding that
federal law did not pre-empt the fuel tax.3 The court recognized that "[t]his
conclusion may have been based on the assumption that the statutes imposed
the taxes on the consumer."'3 However, because the Court of Appeals conclud-
ed that the retailer bore the incidence of the tax, it presumed pre-emption.3
To defeat this presumption, said the Court, the State needed to show an
explicit statement from Congress that state law shall apply. 4 The Court held
that Oklahoma failed to defeat this presumption because it did not raise such a
statement. Had Oklahoma argued that the Hayden-Cartwright Act should be
deemed to be such a statement by Congress, the Tenth Circuit might have de-
cided otherwise.
Oklahoma ultimately raised the 1936 legislation in its brief to the United
States Supreme Court.6 However, Justice Ginsburg refused to consider the
issue because "[t]he State made no reference to the Hayden-Cartwright Act in
the courts of first and second instance." 7 Had the Court exercised its authority
24. As the Supreme Court stated:
In addition to the motor fuels and income taxes before us, the Tribe's complaint challenged motor
vehicle excise taxes on Tribe-owned vehicles, retail sales taxes on certain purchases by the Tribe for
its own use, and sales taxes on 3.2% beer sold at the Tribe's two convenience stores, as well as tax
warrants issued against officers of the Tribe. In the course of litigation, Oklahoma apparently decided
not to contest the Tribe's claims regarding the vehicle and retail sales taxes, and withdrew the war-
rants; the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of
summary judgment for the State on the 3.2% beer tax, and the Tribe has not sought review of that
issue.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214, 2218 n.3 (1995).
25. Chickasaw, 31 F.3d at 971.




30. Id. (discussing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 502, 502.2, 502.6, 516, 520, and 522, in light of § 302,




34. See id. (citing Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 719-20 (1983)).
35. See id.
36. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 23-24.
37. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214, 2219 (1995).
[Vol. 32:139
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 32 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol32/iss1/8
HAYDEN-CARTWRIGHT: A READY REMEDY
to review the Act,38 it would have examined legislation deeply rooted in
America's quest for mobility and economic development.
iiM. HIGHWAY FUNDING3 9
The first decades of the twentieth century saw a rapid increase in the popu-
larity of the automobile. Only 8,000 automobiles dotted the United States in
1900, but by 1910 that number had jumped to 468,500. Just five years later the
number of automobiles had grown to almost two and a half million.'
States and local governments initiated early efforts to build durable roads
for the new cars.4 They paid for road construction by taxing real property.42
This was the method used when Congress passed the first federal aid highway
bill in an effort to improve rural mail delivery service.' That 1916 legislation
provided for state-federal cost-sharing, state maintenance and construction of
federally funded roads, and the free public use of all federally subsidized
roads.'
The use of property taxes to pay for this effort proved an Achilles' heel for
many states. Extensive federal lands in the Western states required public roads.
However, because national forests and military and Indian reservations were not
private property, they failed to generate property taxes for road construction.'
The smaller populations of Western states also produced fewer property tax
revenues.
As a result, states stopped using property taxes to fund highways. States
shifted the burden to road users by imposing motor fuel taxes.' While this led
to consistency of revenue production,47 Western states "were still handicapped
because of 'public lands and Indian reservations."'"
38. Id. The Chickasaw conceded this authority: "[Tihere is no statutory requirement that an issue be
raised in the court of appeals in order for this Court to enjoy the power to decide... Brief of Respondent,
supra note 16, at 16.
39. See Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Na-
tion, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995) (No. 94-771) [hereinafter Brief of the Anici].
40. U.S. DEPARTmENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AMERICA'S HIGHWAYS, 1776-1976, A HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL AID PROGRAM 67 (1976) [hereinafter AMERICA'S HIGHWAYS].
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. Act of July 11, 1916, ch. 241, 39 StaL 355.
44. See id. at 356. During floor debate on an amendment by Senator Hayden to the National Highway
Appropriations Bill, 80 CONG. REc. 6914 (1936), Senator Russell noted that the Federal Government was
paying for the greater portion of road construction at that time:
This is an effort to reach out on the farm-to-market roads and benefit not only those who are tourists,
and who move from State to State over our highways but to give passable roads, all-weather roads, to
the farmers and others who live in the rural sections.
Id.
45. Pmu H. BURCH, JR., HIGHWAY REVENUES AND EXPENDITURE PoLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 218
(1962).
46. See AMERICA'S HIGHWAYS, supra note 40, at 115.
47. See id. at 123-24.
48. Brief of the Amici, supra note 39, at 20.
19961
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These handicaps were significant.49 First, sparsely populated, yet extensive
tracts of public land required extensive and costly road construction." Second,
filling stations on populated public lands such as military and Indian reserva-
tions sold gasoline without charging the state motor fuel tax." People pur-
chased motor fuel tax-free and then consumed it while adding wear and tear to
state-maintained roads.
In 1934 the Supreme Court endorsed this practice.52 Western states re-
sponded by seeking federal legislation that would ensure their ability to fund
and maintain roads.53 "Bills were introduced allowing States to collect their
motor fuel taxes within federal areas."'54 The resulting legislation was the Fed-
eral Aid Highway Appropriations bill,5 to which Arizona Senator Carl Hayden
introduced an amendment that permitted states to tax motor fuel sold on "mili-
tary or other reservations when such fuels are used for other than governmental
purposes." 6
At Conference Committee, Senator Hayden found a strong advocate for his
amendment. Oklahoma Representative Wilburn Cartwright chaired the Roads
Committee in the House and was instrumental in developing the national inter-
state highway system." Motivated in part by the belief that the "highway
brings cheaper living.., and in addition furnishes access to the centers of mar-
keting for the small agriculturalist," ' Cartwright said that "[p]erhaps nothing
has done so much to make this nation a great neighborhood as the chain of
highways linking North and South, East and West." 9 Additionally, Cartwright
was a member of the House Indian Affairs committee.'
49. See id.
50. See id. at 20-21.
51. See id. at 21.
52. See id. The Supreme Court held that California's state motor fuel tax could not be imposed on gaso-
line sold at the Presidio, a military reservation in San Francisco. Standard Oil Co. v. California, 291 U.S. 242
(1934). As a result, motorists could purchase Presidio gasoline state-tax free and for consumption on state-
maintained public highways. Id.
53. Senator Hayden read the following resolution adopted at the 1936 Annual Meeting of the western
Association of State Highway Officials:
Whereas this conference views with alarm the continued sale of motor vehicle fuels on Govern-
ment military and other reservations, upon which no State tax has been collected, such tax-free fuel
being used on the public highways; and
Whereas the various States have no remedy under existing laws; Now therefore, be it Resolved,
That this conference pledge its support to a bill now before Congress (H. R. 3660) sponsored by the
North American Gasoline Tax Conference, which, if enacted, will confer upon the several States au-
thority to collect motor vehicle fuel taxes on all sales made on such reservations other than to the
United States government or its agencies.
80 CONG. REc. 6913 (1936).
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Id. (emphasis added). "The general purpose of the Hayden-Cartwright Act clearly was to further and
extend the program of highway improvement which had been initiated by the Federal Aid Highway Act of
1916, 39 Stat. 355 .... Minnesota v. Keeley, 126 F.2d 863, 864 (8th Cir. 1942).
57. The author thanks the staff of the Carl Albert Congressional Research Center for facilitating his
review of Congressman Cartwright's documents. The Center's address is University of Oklahoma, Monnet
Hall, Room 202, 630 Parrington Oval, Norman, Oklahoma 73019-0375.
58. Wilbum Cartwright, The Value of Good Roads to a Community (no date) (unpublished manuscript,
courtesy of the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center Congressional Archives, University of
Oklahoma).
59. Id. at 3.
60. See Biographical Sketch Accompanying Profile of Wilburn Cartwright Collection at Carl Albert Cen-
[Vol. 32:139
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Routinely reelected to Congress by a strong Indian constituency,"
Cartwright was well positioned to consider the impact of Hayden's road funding
legislation on American Indians, particularly those from Oklahoma.62 Together
with Senator Hayden, Cartwright gave states a powerful tool for economic
development-the power to tax motor fuel sold throughout the state, even on
federal reservations.
IV. HAYDEN-CARTWRiGHT AcT
In 1936, Congress passed what became known as the Hayden-Cartwright
Act.6' A pertinent portion of the Act provides:
§ 104. Tax on motor fuel sold on military or other reservation[;] reports to
State taxing authority
(a) All taxes levied by any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia
upon, with respect to, or measured by, sales, purchases, storage, or use of
gasoline or other motor vehicle fuels may be levied, in the same manner
and to the same extent, with respect to such fuels when sold by or
through post exchanges, ship stores, ship service stores, commissaries,
filling stations, licensed traders, and other similar agencies, located on
United States military or other reservations, when such fuels are not for
the exclusive use of the United States. Such taxes, so levied, shall be paid
to the proper taxing authorities of the State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia, within whose borders the reservation affected may be locat-
ed.'
On its face, this amendment allows a state to tax motor fuel sold at filling
stations and by licensed traders located on "United States military or other
reservations."' s While there is apparently little dispute that "licensed traders"
applies to Indian trading posts,' the use of the word "reservation" has prompt-
ed considerable controversy. First, does "reservation" mean Indian land? Sec-
ond, if it does, is the term limited to the formal borders of Indian lands such as
the Apache, Navajo, and Gila River reservations in Arizona, or does it extend
to the debated status67 of Indian lands" found in Oklahoma?69
ter, University of Oklahoma, at 23 (Univ. of Oklahoma, 1995).
61. See id. at 24.
62. Indeed, "[t]he substantial number of Native Americans in [Oklahoma's] Third [Congressional] Dis-
trict... received the support of the congressman, who played a role in issues involving Indian lands, hospi-
tals, and schools." Id.
63. Pub. L. No. 74-582, § 10, 49 Stat. 1519, 1521-22 (1936) (codified as amended at 4 U.S.C. § 104
(1994) (emphasis added)).
64. 4 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. See Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 689 (1965). See also Application
of Federal and State Sales Taxes to Activities of Menominee Indian Mills, 57 Interior Dec. 129, 139 (1940).
67. See generally, Kickingbird, supra note 17; D. Faith Orlowski and Robbie Emery Burke, Oklahoma
Indian Titles, 29 TULSA LJ. 361 (1993); Angela M. Risenhoover, Note, Reservation Disestablishment: The
Undecided Issue in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, 29 TuLSA Li. 781 (1994).
68. The Federal statutes currently define "Indian country" as:
[AJII land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Gov-
ernment, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the
1996]
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A. "Reservations," Broadly Speaking
States urging that Hayden-Cartwright authorizes state taxation of fuel sold
on Indian lands7° rely on language in the Act which permits such taxation on
reservations,71 as well as judicial and executive interpretations that equate
"reservations" with Indian land generally.' As noted, the Act specifically
states that fuel taxes may be levied on fuels sold by dealers "located on United
States military or other reservations"'n where "such fuels are not for the exclu-
sive use of the United States." 74
Contemporaneous executive agency interpretations indicate that "reserva-
tion" carries a broad meaning within the Hayden-Cartwright Act. When con-
fronted with the issue in 1940, Solicitor of the Interior Margold, representing
the agency charged with applying the Act, concluded that Hayden-Cartwright
authorizes a state to tax sales of motor fuel by an on-reservation tribal enter-
prise to Indians and non-Indians.75 In 1936, the United States Attorney General
stated that the term "reservation" in the Act "describe[s] any body of land, large
or small, which Congress has reserved from sale for any purpose. It may be a
military reservation, or an Indian reservation, or, indeed, one for any purpose
for which Congress has authority to provide .... "76 In short, "reservation"
denotes land that has been set aside by the federal government for a particular
purpose.
Admittedly, such a broad interpretation is limited by the fact that Indian
lands, be they reservations or otherwise, have not only been created by Con-
reservation... all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits
of a state, and ... all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, in-
cluding rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988).
The Supreme Court has applied this definition from the criminal code to civil cases. See Risenhoover,
supra note 65, at 782 (citing DeCouteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975); Moe v.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 478-79 (1976)). To see how the Court has "moved
away from categorizing the land at issue," id., see infra note 87 and accompanying text.
69. Indeed, concern that "reservation" did not apply to Oklahoma's Indian lands may have prompted the
Oklahoma Tax Commission not to raise Hayden-Cartwright at the District or Circuit Courts:
Oklahoma did not assert the Act in defense of its tax in the lower courts because it was of the view
that the "relevant boundary for taxing jurisdiction is the perimeter of a formal reservation, not merely
land set aside for a tribe or its members." Sac and Fox, 113 S. Ct. at 1991 .... The State therefore
viewed Chickasaw lands as indistinguishable for fuel tax purposes from other lands; because Chicka-
saw lands were seen as within the State's taxing jurisdiction, they were seen as outside the scope of
the Hayden-Cartwright Act. But the Court's decision in Sac and Fox, issued after the State filed its
brief in the court of appeals, rejected the State's position--and therefore implicitly made clear that
the Act applies to Indian country.
Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 24. For a strong argument that Indian lands in Oklahoma include exten-
sive reservations that have not been disestablished, see Kickingbird, supra note 17.
70. See Brief of the Amici, supra note 39, at 20.
71. Id. at 23.
72. Id. at 23-24 (citing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993)).
73. 4 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1994).
74. Id.
75. See Application of Federal and State Sales Taxes to Activities of Menominee Indian Mills, 57 Interi-
or Dec. 129, 140 (1940).
76. 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 522, 524 (1936) (citing United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909)).
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gress, but by treaty and executive order. As such, one could argue that these
administrative interpretations should be extended only to those Indian lands
Congress specifically contemplated. However, as this article discusses later, the
Supreme Court has made clear that it is not the source of the Indian land which
counts for taxation purposes but the fact that it is Indian land.'
States' power to tax fuel sales nondiscriminatorily within their borders
rests on a multi-layered foundation. These layers include court deference to
agency interpretations when seeking legislative intent, a trend away from for-
malistic interpretation of "reservation," the strength of the plain language of the
statute and Congressional intent as found in road funding legislation. The threat
to economic development posed by a denial of taxation power and the clear risk
of balkanizing our population provide further grounds to reaffirm state taxation
power.
1. Agency Interpretation
The Supreme Court has made clear that an agency interpretation should be
deferred to when it is thorough "in its consideration," valid in its reasoning, and
consistent with earlier and later pronouncements' Here, the Solicitor of the
Interior interpreted the Act."
The Court should also defer to agency interpretation because Congressional
reenactment without substantial change is evidence that Congress intended the
meaning assigned by the agency. Congress did so just seven years after Interior
Solicitor Margold concluded that the phrase "other reservation" authorized state
taxation of fuels sold by Indian tribes. 0 A well-known rule of statutory inter-
pretation, recently "imbu[ed] with constitutional significance,"'" provides that
when Congress does so, it is "constitutionally less legitimate for unelected
judges" to resolve statutory ambiguities where "executive agencies, which are
responsible to the President, an elected official," have interpreted them. 2 That
is, because Congress re-enacted Hayden-Cartwright after it was aware that the
Solicitor of the Interior had interpreted reservation broadly to include all Indian
lands, it is to be presumed that Congress intended "reservation" to carry that
same broad meaning when it enacted the amendment.
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence may, in fact, mandate deference to
the Solicitor's interpretation. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron
U.SA., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council,3 a court must defer to any
77. See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
78. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
79. Woods, supra note 5.
80. See Pub. L. No. 80-389, § 104, 61 Stat. 644 (1947).
81. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 618 (1992).
82. Id. (discussing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984))
("As applied by the Court, the Chevron clear statement rule is the following: Unless refuted by the clear lan-
guage of the statute, the court must defer to the agency interpretation.").
83. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute. 4 As commentators
have noted, Chevron requires that "unless refuted by the clear language of the
statute, a court must defer to the agency interpretation.""5 This is true even
where constitutional issues are involved.86
2. Freedom from Formalism
The Supreme Court should also read the term "reservation" broadly be-
cause its precedents have refused to imprison "reservation" in a formalistic
interpretation. In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indi-
an Tribe of Oklahoma,"' the Supreme Court considered whether Oklahoma
could assess and collect from a tribe back taxes on cigarette sales made on
tribal trust land rather than on a formal reservation.88 The Court said that Okla-
homa could not, noting that "[no] precedent of this Court has ever drawn the
distinction between tribal trust land and reservations that Oklahoma urges."89
"Rather," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we ask whether the area has been
'validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence
of the Government."
The Court subsequently underscored its broad interpretation of "reserva-
tion" in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation.9 There, the Court
considered whether Oklahoma could apply income and motor vehicle taxes to
Indians who lived off a formal reservation. The Court "put an end to the argu-
ment ... that there was some distinction between a formal reservation and trust
land." In holding that Oklahoma could not tax Indians who lived off tribal
trust lands or reservations without specific permission from Congress,93 the
Court said the operative term was "Indian country." This phrase includes "for-
mal and informal reservations, dependent Indian communities, and Indian allot-
ments, whether restricted or held in trust by the United States."94 By interpret-
ing "reservation" to include trust land, Potawatomi and Sac and Fox bolster the
84. See id.
"If, however, the court determines Congress has directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the ab-
sence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.'
BERNARD ScHWARTZ, ADMiNSTRATIVE LAW 702 (3d ed. 1991) (discussing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). This
is true even where serious constitutional issues are involved. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
85. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 81, at 618.
86. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
87. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
88. See id. at 511 (relying on Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973)).
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1978)).
91. 508 U.S. 114 (1993).
92. Risenhoover, supra note 67, at 781.
93. See Sac and Fox, 508 U.S. at 128.
94. Id. (holding that "absent explicit congressional direction to the contrary," it must be presumed that a
State does not have jurisdiction to tax tribal members who live and work in Indian country, "whether the par-
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argument that Hayden-Cartwright applies to Oklahoma Indian lands, regardless
of what labels those lands bear.
3. Plain Language
A review of the same highway funding bill which houses Hayden-
Cartwright confirms that "reservation" includes, but is not limited to, Indian
reservations. Section 3 provides:
For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of section 3 of the Federal
Highway Act of 1921, as amended... there is hereby authorized to be
appropriated for the survey, construction, reconstruction, and maintenance
of main roads through unappropriated or unreserved public lands, nontax-
able Indian lands, or other Federal reservations other than the forest reser-
vations, the sum of $2,500,000...
This specific allotment of federal funds was for "Indian lands" or other
Federal reservations other than forest reservations. Clearly, Congress did not
intend to confine "reservation" to the narrow and specific boundaries of lands
such as the Navajo, Apache, and Gila River reservations of Arizona. The phrase
"or other Federal reservations" suggests that the words immediately preceding it
are also federal reservations. Those words are "non-taxable Indian lands."
Indeed, Thomas MacDonald, Chief of the Bureau of Public Roads, said that
"the unreserved public lands and nontaxable Indian lands constitute practically
all of the lands to which this text has any major application."'
The use of "non-taxable" does not defeat this interpretation. All it indicates
is that Indian lands were to be treated the same as military or forest reservations
in that they were immune from state real property taxation. Section 104 makes
clear that fuel taxes could be imposed on such lands as long as they were not
direct taxes on the government."
The Supreme Court has supported this interpretation in other state taxation
cases. In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,9 the Court considered
whether Arizona could apply its motor carrier license and use fuel taxes to a
non-tribal owned logging company doing business on the White Mountain
Apache reservation."° The Court held that Arizona could not apply such li-
cense taxes because Congress had imposed a comprehensive regulation on tribal
timber harvesting and sale. °" However, Justice Marshall said that States could
still apply nondiscriminatory state tax law[s] within their borders 2 as long as
95. H.R. 11687, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1936).
96. Statement of Thomas H. MacDonald to House of Representatives Committee on Roads at 55 (March
12, 1936).
97. Id.
98. See 4 U.S.C. § 104 (1994).
99. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
100. See id at 137-38.
101. See id. at 151. The use tax in White Mountain Apache differs from the fuel tax in Chickasaw be-
cause it was applied to travel on roads that had been "built, maintained, and policed exclusively by the Feder-
al Government, the Tribe and its contractors." Id. at 150.
102. Id. at 144 & n.11 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973)).
1996]
11
Bloeser: Hayden-Cartwright: A Ready Remedy for Oklahoma's Indian Fuel Tax
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1996
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
those laws do not unduly burden "on-reservation conduct involving only Indi-
ans.' f 0
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe,' the
Court affirmed that a State may tax sales by Indian tribes to non-Indians. In
that case, an Indian tribe successfully challenged Oklahoma's power to collect
back taxes on tribal cigarette sales between Indians on tribal trust land. 5 The
Court held that the doctrine of Indian sovereign immunity prevented Oklahoma
from suing the tribe for these past taxes"° unless the tribe consented 7 or
Congress specifically permitted the action. 8 However, the Court said that the
"doctrine does not excuse a tribe from all obligations to assist in the collection
of validly imposed state sales taxes."'" Referring to the Court's earlier hold-
ing in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,"' Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained that requiring the tribal seller to collect all state taxes
applicable to sales to non-Indians "was a minimal burden justified by the
State's interest in assuring the payment of ... lawful taxes.""'
Furthermore, the Court "rejects the argument that this governmental entity
-the Tribe-is completely immune from legal process."".2 As the Court said,
"[w]e have never held that individual agents or officers of a tribe are not liable
for damages in actions brought by the State.""'
4. Legislative Intent
The history of the road legislation reveals that Congress intended that
states share responsibility with the Federal government for the construction of
roads within their borders. Furthermore, Congress intended that states bear the
complete burden for the maintenance of the roads."4 To facilitate this activity,
Congress, through the Hayden-Cartwright Act, granted states the authority to
tax fuel sold on Indian lands.
That Congress viewed itself in a partnership with states is clear from the
history of the roads funding legislation. In fact, consistent with the "immediate
object of the Federal Constitution,"".5 no other governmental entity is contem-
plated. In discussing the purposes of the National Highway funding bill, Senator
103. Id. at 144.
104. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
105. See id. at 512-14.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 509.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 512 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980)).
110. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
111. Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 512. See also Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation,
447 U.S. 134 (1980).
112. Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 514.
114. See MacDonald, supra note 96, at 67.
115. THE FEDERALIST No. 14 (James Madison). "[T]he immediate object of the Federal Constitution is to
secure the union of the Thirteen Primitive States, which we know to be practicable; and to add to them such
other States, as may arise in their own bosoms or in their neighbourhoods ... " Id.
[Vol. 32:139
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Hayden said, "[s]ince 1916-through two-decades the States and the Federal
Government have been working in excellent cooperation upon the gigantic task
of providing our country with adequate highways."".6 Enacting such legisla-
tion was unquestionably desirable so that "orderly processes of both Federal and
State Government shall be permitted to function to the highest advantage."'
17
The authors of the legislation viewed any relationship other than that be-
tween Congress and the states as unacceptable. As Senator Hayden reported in
1936,
Federal highway legislation has from its inception consistently adhered to
cooperation with each State through its State highway department and any
other course is wholly impracticable. It would jeopardize the Federal
relationship to the 48 States if the Federal government were to deal direct-
ly with the 3,100 counties upon highway matters."'
Representative Cartwright told his constituents that Congress saw itself in
partnership with states, not other entities. In a letter to Mr. Robert Maret of
Caddo, Oklahoma,"9 Cartwright responded to Maret's concerns that his mail
route was in bad condition. Cartwright told Mr. Maret that he needed to address
his concerns to the county commissioner. The federal government had previous-
ly allocated funds to various states for "farm-to-market" road work. Representa-
tive Cartwright informed Mr. Maret of the process needed to get the roads
repaired. The process consisted of a county commissioner initiating the project,
the state highway commission allocating the funds from the grant, and the
Works Product Administration repairing the roads." °
5. Economic Development
The public threat posed by continued depletion of tax revenue for road
maintenance and construction also warrants equalization of taxation through
Hayden-Cartwright. The shrinking of resources promises to impair the state's
ability to provide for its citizens a need basic to economic development: good
roads.'' Infrastructure is important to economic development. This apparent
tautology is evident from the fact that those countries that have acquired the
most wealth are those with the most extensive transportation infrastructures.'
The reason for the relationship is clear. Without the transportation infrastruc-
ture, of which roads form a large part, components cannot be shipped efficiently
116. S. Rep. No. 1976, at 2 (1936).
117. Id. at 3.
118. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
119. See Letter from Representative Wilburn Cartwright to Mr. Robert Maret, Caddo, Oklahoma (October
31, 1936) (on file with author).
120. See id.
121. "In the long run, investment in transportation infrastructure is the key link to economic development
and increasing the state's tourism dollars." Ford, supra note 1, at A24 (citing the Oklahoma Good Roads and
Streets Association).
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to manufacturing facilities for assembly. That same infrastructure makes possi-
ble the finished goods' trip to market.
Economic development is not, however, its own raison d'etre. It encourag-
es social stability. Without good roads citizens may begin to view the State as
ineffective." As one scholar has noted, "[iln the modem world... effective-
ness means primarily constant economic development. Those nations which
have adapted more successfully to the requirements of an industrial system have
the fewest internal political strains . . . " If unchecked, "a breakdown of effec-
tiveness ... will endanger even a legitimate system's stability."" 4
6. A Bulwark Against Balkanization
Any long-term dilution of states' ability to exercise their taxation power
equally over lands within their borders threatens to balkanize states along ethnic
lines. Central to our national ethic is the realization that "all men are created
equal. ''"" To tell the non-Indian retailer that the competitor across the street
may undercut him and force his business to close because the competitor's
ancestors arrived on these shores earlier is to tell that retailer that he is not
equal to the Indian. To do so is to discard a central cause of America's domes-
tic tranquility and consequent economic growth." As a result, that retailer
may no longer look at the person across the street in fellow citizenship terms;
ethnicity may now be the language of the day. In a severe economic downturn,
what is to prevent Oklahoma from severe ethnic conflict?'
B. But What of Tribal Sovereignty?
The real reason for the Court's Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw
Nation ruling and its unwillingness to pick up Hayden-Cartwright may not be
hard to find. If not a tacit endorsement, it accords with a "federal policy of
promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development."'29 This policy is
clearly articulated in the Indian Financing Act of 1974,3' which provides that
123. Effectiveness has been defined as "actual performance, the extent to which the system satisfies the
basic functions of government as most of the population and such powerful groups within it as big business
or the armed forces see them." SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPsET, POLrICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS
64 (1981).
124. Id. at 67-68.
125. T-m DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
126. Oklahoma State Representative Don Webb has stated that such an "unfair advantage... could prove
disastrous to private businesses as well as to the state of Oklahoma." Brian Ford, Tribe's Exemption From
Gas Tax Under Fire, TULSA WORLD, June 25, 1995, at N18.
127. See ALEXIS DE TOcQUEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1945); see also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON,
POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968); ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARcHY: PARTICIPATION AND
OPPOSITION (1971).
128. Germany, Britain, and France are all examples of developed countries that have experienced sub-
stantial periods of ethnic harmony, but which have recently witnessed ethnic splintering prompted by econom-
ic downturns.
129. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
130. 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1994).
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[i]t is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress... to help develop
and utilize Indian resources, both physical and human, to a point where
the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the utilization and man-
agement of their own resources and where they will enjoy a standard of
living from their own productive efforts comparable to that enjoyed by
non-Indians in neighboring communities.'
This Congressional policy is clearly limited in two respects. First, by its
own terms, the policy applies to the Indians' "own productive efforts," not to
the mere marketing of goods produced by someone else. Second, while the
policy is rooted in "traditional notions of Indian self-government"'3 that are
"deeply ingrained in [the Court's] jurisprudence,"'3 those notions of sover-
eignty' find little basis in reality.
Sovereignty is a special status that has both internal and external character-
istics. "[I]ntemal sovereignty... means supremacy over all other authorities
within [a] territory and population."' 35 "[E]xtemal sovereignty [denotes] inde-
pendence of outside authorities"'36 and a "recognition by other states as a le-
gally equal player in the global environment.' 37 The tribes have retained nei-
ther internal nor external sovereignty. In 1968, for example, Congress adopted
the Indian Civil Rights Act as Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. That Act
"limit[s] the power of tribal governments by applying portions of the federal
Bill of Rights to Indian tribes."'38 More than four-thousand statutes and trea-
ties affect Native Americans.
39
Indeed, the Court has stated that "platonic notions" of tribal sovereignty
are no longer the rule of law." Even though "various Indian tribes were once
independent and sovereign nations," and even though "their claim to sovereign-
ty long predates that of our own Government[,] ... Indians today are American
citizens.''.
The argument that the Court should emasculate States' taxation power
because it has previously contemplated a tribal quasi-sovereignty, 42 ignores
the modem legal truth that tribes and states do not share a common claim to
sovereignty. Rather, "through their original incorporation into the United States
131. See id.
132. White Mountain Apache, 448 U.S. at 143.
133. Id.
134. "[W]e have recognized that the Indian tribes retain 'attributes of sovereignty over both their members
and their territory."' Id. at 142 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
135. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 8 (1977).
136. Id.
137. BARRY B. HUGHES, CONTINUIrY AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS: THE CLASH OF PERSPECIVES
67 (1991). In this context, "states" refers to countries.
138. Rennard J. Strickland, Indian Bill of Rights, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 427 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
139. See Rennard J. Strickland, Native Americans, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 577, 578 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
140. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
141. Id.
142. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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as well as through specific treaties and statutes, the Indian tribes have lost many
of the attributes of sovereignty."'43 The result is that "tribes do not possess the
same attributes of sovereignty that the Federal Government and the several
States enjoy.'"
144
Today, just as when James Madison penned Federalist number 14, the
"immediate object of the Federal Constitution is to secure the union of the...
States." 45 Any policy which hobbles a quarter of our States by denying them
the power to tax nondiscriminatorily lands regardless of the owners' ethnicity
threatens the economic strength of one partner in our national marriage. Aspira-
tions for American ethnic enclaves do not provide just cause to weaken States
or the federal union our constitution created.
V. AVOIDING THE CURE: OKLAHOMA'S RESPONSE
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw, the Court did not foreclose
Oklahoma's options. However, by failing to decide the Hayden-Cartwright issue
in Oklahoma's favor, it left those options toothless.
Justice Ginsburg stated that Oklahoma could in fact, tax motor fuel sold by
Indian retailers." However, to satisfy the Court, she said that Oklahoma must
clearly place the legal incidence of the tax somewhere besides the tribe: "[I]f a
State is unable to enforce a tax because the legal incidence of the impost is on
Indians or Indian tribes, the State generally is free to amend its law to shift the
tax's legal incidence."' 47
Soon after the Court issued its opinion, Oklahoma sought a solution to its
fuel tax woes. Then Stanley Johnston, then Counsel to the Oklahoma Tax Com-
missioners, informed the commissioners that the Oklahoma legislature could
shift the "legal incidence" at least three ways.'" The legislature adopted a hy-
brid.
The legislature can move the legal incidence of the tax "away from the
retailer," Johnston wrote, "where it cannot be enforced if the retailer is an Indi-
an tribe. .. ." It can shift the tax to "(a) the ultimate consumer; (b) the dis-
tributor; or (c) the refiner/importer."'"5 None of these options offers the taxa-
tion security of Congress's specific grant of authority in Hayden-Cartwright.
143. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 (1981).
144. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 169 (1982).
145. THE FEDERALIST No. 14 (James Madison).
146. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. CL 2214, 2221 (1995).
147. Id.
148. See Memorandum from Stanley Johnston, Counsel to the Commissioners, Oklahoma Tax Commis-
sion, to Robert Anderson, Robert Cullison, and Don Kilpatrick (June 27, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Johnston Memorandum]. Both the legal incidence and the point of collection can shift.
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A. The Ultimate Consumer
The Oklahoma legislature could collect the tax from the ultimate consumer
by means of at least four financing schemes: "Full pre-payment of tax [with]
refunds/credits"; "Tax-free sale to Indian retailer with duty to collect from non-
member consumers"; "Limited quantity allowance for tax-free purchase [with]
balance prepaid"; and "State/Tribal Compacts.' ' .
The full pre-payment scheme coupled with refunds and credits is that
which had been applied to non-Indian retailers. 2 If applied to Indian retailers,
they would "pre-pay the tax on 100% of fuel purchased for resale."'5 They
would receive "either refunds or credit against future purchases for documented
exempt sales."' 54 While the scheme would be "both convenient and efficient
for the purposes of the State's tax administration,"'55 it is vulnerable. "It is
subject to the tribe's challenge... that the State is attempting to tax, even for a
short time, sales to members of the tribe."'5 6 Under Oklahoma Tax Commis-
sion v. Sac and Fox"7 and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band
Potawatami Indian Tribe,"8 such a tax might well be held impermissible.
Another option Johnston presented is based on Oklahoma's general sales
tax code.'59 It is also flawed. This "honor system" would require the State to
sell all fuel tax-free to "qualified Indian retailers."'' The retailer would then
remit to the State taxes it collected "from all non-exempt consumers.'' Un-
der the general tax scheme such vendors "are held personally liable for the tax
if they fail either to collect it or to remit it to the State."'62 However, as
Johnston stated, "The potential problem.., is (1) the inability of the State to
audit the tribal seller's records without the tribe's consent; and (2) the inability
of the State to enforce a claim directly against a tribe for unremitted non-ex-
empt taxes."'63
A third option also fails to offer the taxation security of the Hayden-
Cartwright Act. Under this "limited quantity tax-free" plan, Indian retailers
could buy a "preset quantity of motor fuel free of the State's tax, based upon
the probable amount which would reasonably be resold (tax exempt) to tribal
members."' 6" Additional fuel which the retailer may purchase "would be pre-
sumed to be taxable sales to non-members, and the tribal or Indian retailer
would be required to prepay the tax on any quantities purchased in excess of






157. 508 U.S. 114 (1993).
158. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
159. See Johnston Memorandum, supra note 148, at 4-5.
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the allowance."'65 Johnston believed that this method "has [a] two-fold advan-
tage": first, it does not levy or pre-collect taxes on motor fuel that "can reason-
ably be expected to be purchased by tribal members.. .";"66 second, the
method preserves the "State's right to impose and collect its tax on motor fuel
sold to non-members of the tribe."'67
However, the method is not a panacea. If it were to prove an effective
means of taxing fuel sales to non-tribal members, it would negate any signifi-
cant advantage a tribe had for going into the fuel resale business. If it proved
ineffective and tax revenue slipped through the cracks, the doctrine of Indian
sovereign immunity would preclude an action against the tribe for recovery of
the lost taxes.68
B. The Distributor
An alterative that won some legislative support would have placed the
legal incidence of the tax "directly on the distributor . ..." The alternative
"address[es] the immediate situation but would not likely solve the prob-
lem."'70 Two fatal flaws make it a poor second choice to the Hayden-
Cartwright Act. First, there is no reason why an Indian tribe could not go into
the fuel distribution business, "operating that business on and from Indian coun-
try.'' If it did so, the legal incidence of the tax would once again be imper-
missible because it would fall on the tribe in Indian country.' Oklahoma
would be back where it started.
Placing the legal incidence of the tax on the distributor is flawed for a
second reason. As a distributor, a tribe's resale market "would expand to in-
clude not only consumers, but also other retailers, Indian or non-Indian."'7
Under Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, Oklahoma could tax
neither the tribe's retail nor its wholesale sales. 74
C. Oklahoma's Choice: The Refiner/Importer and Compacts
1. Moving the Collection Point
Moving the collection point even further up the distribution chain, com-
bined with clearly placing the legal incidence on the consumer, proved too
tempting to resist. The Oklahoma legislature sought its solution to its fuel tax




168. "Suits against Indian tribes are... barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe
or congressional abrogation." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).






175. "The purpose of this recodification is a result of the interpretation of the motor fuel tax code of this
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moved the point of collection from the retailer to the refinery or bulk transfer
terminal. 76 There, the tax is pre-collected but the consumer bears the legal
incidence. This method, Johnston had stated, would reduce the number of tax
collection points, and "placing the tax directly upon the refiner or importer," it
might "resolve the problem of attempting to tax Indians or Indian tribes on
transactions in Indian country."'"
Johnston suggested two primary problems with moving tax collection to
the "rack."' 78 First, moving the tax to the refiner or importer will only work if
tribes are unable or unwilling to become fuel refiners or importers.'79 Clearly
not all tribes could assume such roles, but "it seems reasonable to conclude that
other tribes might find such business activity both commercially desirable and
within their means."'80
Moving the tax to the refiner or importer would appear to open the gates
to a Trojan horse. This metaphor is justified where a tribe or tribal entity elects
to import out-of-state motor fuel directly into Indian country. Such fuel current-
ly arrives in Oklahoma by pipeline and tanker truck.'' Were a tribe or tribal
entity to act as the importer at a fuel storage/import terminal located on Indian
country, "all fuel brought into and sold from that terminal would be beyond the
State's power to tax.""' However, this problem might be somewhat muted by
clearly placing the tax's legal incidence on the consumer.
Johnston also wondered whether the refiner or importer could pass on its
tax to a tribal seller or reseller who had "only purchased motor fuel from non-
Indian refiners and importers."'83 Examining Chickasaw, the counsel for the
Oklahoma Tax Commissioners noted that "a tribal seller [can] be required to
collect a state tax on the tribe's non-exempt customer."'84 However, a State
may "not impose a transaction privilege tax on the seller of goods where the
goods [are] sold to a tribal entity on Indian country, and the cost [is] passed on
to the tribe."'" Once again, placing the tax's legal incidence on the consumer
may alleviate this concern to some extent. However, such taxation trapdoors
suggest that moving the collection point to the refiner/importer is merely a
placebo for the State's tax woes. The reason Chapter 345 fails to offer the
taxation security of Hayden-Cartwright is rooted in the second component of
the legislation-compacts.
state by ... the Supreme Court of the United States in 'Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation."'
1996 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 345.
176. See id.





182. Id. at 7.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980)).
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2. Compacts
Chapter 345 of the 1996 Oklahoma Session Laws had another component.
Through it, the legislature offered the tribes a deal described by one legislator
as "extortion."' 86 Partially intended "for the purpose of limiting litigation,"'
87
Chapter 345 offers Oklahoma tribes contracts. 8 If a tribe "will not challenge
the constitutionality of this act or [its] application,"'89 the State will apportion
among the tribes a percentage of the States's total fuel tax revenues, ranging
from 3% in 1996 to 4 1/2% between 1998 and the year 2 016 ."9 This revenue
given to the tribe must be used for "tribal government programs limited to
highway and bridge construction, health, education, corrections, and law en-
forcement.'
191
Such "compacts" with tribes are subject to criticism, some of it already
highlighted by Counselor Johnston. First, they do not assure the level of tax
revenue that Hayden-Cartwright offers. Second, they discourage the existence of
a level playing field among fuel retailers in Oklahoma.
Compacts have been tried before; a similar compact governing cigarette
taxes already exists between Oklahoma and the tribes.' That experience sug-
gests the motor fuel tax compact may be flawed in several respects. First,
among the thirty-nine registered Indian tribes in Oklahoma, it is doubtful that
there would be complete agreement. 93 As former Representative Howard
Cotner, chairman of the Oklahoma Revenue and Taxation Committee has said,
"[There is] a difference in attitude in the tribal areas in that the eastern tribes
have a better working relationship than the western tribes."'94 As a result,
"[y]ou could not work out a compact [that] they would all adhere to ... .,"
An absence of complete agreement would leave some tribes free to undercut
their competitors; those that entered into the compacts would be at a relative
disadvantage.
The current cigarette compact also severely inhibits state taxation power.
Member tribes pay only 57.5 cents on each carton of cigarettes they sell.'"
However, their non-Indian competitors must pay $2.30 on each carton, 97 and,
as a result, must charge consumers more. The difference with Chapter 345 is
only one of degree. The new law provides that accepting tribes agree to procure
186. Chuck Ervin, Lawmakers End Work On Key Bills, TULSA WORLD, May 26, 1996 at Al (quoting
Chairman Cotner).
187. See H.B. 2208, § 63(A)(4), 45th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 1996).
188. See id. at § 63(B).
189. Id. at § 63(C)(1).
190. See id. at § 63(C)(3)(a)(b)(c).
191. Id. at § 63(C)(5).
192. Gamallo, supra note 21, at 1.
193. As of July 17, 1995, only 13 tribes had entered into cigarette compacts with the State. Memorandum
from Stanley Johnston to Don Kilpatrick, Secretary-Member of the Oklahoma Tax Commission (July 17,
1995) (copy on file with author).
194. Ford, supra note 126, at N18.
195. Id.
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motor fuel on which the tax has been pre-collected, perhaps thereby leveling the
playing field with respect to accepting tribes.
Chapter 345 followed a season of hot political debate, followed by unprec-
edented tribal donations to coffers of the Democratic party leadership.' 9 Far
from discouraging litigation, Chapter 345 is likely to encourage it. Perhaps
primary among the reasons is the fact that it unequally provides a state benefit
to tribes while denying it to others without clearly serving a rational state inter-
est. Whatever interest the state may have in certainty of tax collection may be
negated by the tremendous loss of revenue made possible under the scheme.
Another problem exists. Because many of the lands that would be made
subject to the compacts are trust lands whose titles are held by the United
States government, the federal government might be a necessary party. Howev-
er, the federal government is not a party to the contracts under Chapter 345. In
its absence, the compacts could be declared unconstitutional."9
Chapter 345 is a far cry from providing Oklahoma the protection offered
by Hayden-Cartwright. The state may not compel a tribe to enter into a contract
with it. As such, significant tax revenue may still be lost from sales by non-
contracting tribes or individuals. While tribes contracting under Chapter 345
agree not to license individuals to sell motor fuels, it is questionable whether
tribes even possess the jurisdiction to make such a choice.
VI. OTHER POSSIBLE RELIEF
The Court's Chickasaw ruling is particularly troublesome because the
statute that authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire trust lands for
Indians is so broad as to leave little protection to the non-Indian businessperson
or to the State. Title 25 of the United States Code, Section 465, is the
Secretary's authorization:
The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to ac-
quire... any interest in lands... within or without existing reserva-
tions ... for the purpose of providing land for Indians.
Title to any lands or rights acquired... shall be taken in the name of the
United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which
the land is acquired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt from State
and local taxation.2
Under this statute, there is little to stop a tribe from purchasing in fee
simple a lot in the most active commercial center of town, deeding it over to
the federal government to keep in trust, and then erecting a filling station at
198. See Brian Ford, House Removes Indian Land Fuel Tax Amendment From Bill, TULSA WORLD, April
19, 1996, at A17.
199. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
200. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1988).
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which it will undercut its competitors on opposite comers. The breadth of the
grant is clear.
However, the statute may be unconstitutional. In a November, 1995 deci-
sion, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it is "an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power... ."2" After examining what it viewed
as the "very broad language of that statute," the Court said:
By its literal terms, the statute permits the Secretary to purchase a factory,
an office building, a residential subdivision, or a golf course in trust for
an Indian tribe, thereby removing these properties from state and local tax
rolls. Indeed, it would permit the Secretary to purchase the Empire State
Building in trust for a tribal chieftain as a wedding present. 2
Such a result could occur because
[t]here are no perceptible "boundaries," no "intelligible principles," within
the four comers of the statutory language that constrain this delegated
authority-except that the acquisition must be "for Indians." It delegates
unrestricted power to acquire land from private citizens for the private use
and benefit of Indian tribes and individual Indians.2°
If the Supreme Court ultimately agrees that Section 465 is constitutionally
crippled, it will put a finger in the dike of state fuel taxation.2" However, if it
fails to recognize Hayden-Cartwright, the leak will go unrepaired.
VII. CONCLUSION
Oklahoma House Minority Leader Larry Ferguson articulated the concern
that Oklahoma shares with similarly situated states: "This problem will not stop
at 13 stations nor a million-dollar tax drain on the State ... This is just the tip
of the iceberg." 5 Indeed, Representative Ferguson's fears may already be
coming to pass. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Oklahoma Tax Commis-
sion v. Chickasaw, at least one tribe has developed a plan to expand consider-
ably its number of gas stations along some of the most heavily traveled roads in
the State."° That same tribe already operates a Texaco station along "the busi-
est truck route in the state and a chief link between Dallas, St. Louis and Chica-
go." Much of the $1.4 million dollars it grosses monthly is due to tax free
sales.20t
Despite the immediacy of this threat to Oklahoma's transportation infra-
structure and its chances for economic development, Congress may leave its
201. South Dakota v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878, 880 (8th Cir. 1995).
202. Id. at 882.
203. Id.
204. The impact of such a decision would depend, to a large extent, on whether the Court applied its
decision retroactively, which is unlikely.
205. Ford, supra note 126, at N18.
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hands folded. It may do so because some proposed legislation directly attempts
to "abolish Indian tribal sovereignty or rights to self-government with respect to
gasoline or motor vehicle fuel sales."' Perhaps solving the fuel tax problem
is simply not a high priority for Congress right now. It needs to be.
If it is not, though, the United States Supreme Court has the power to
affirm States' right to tax motor fuels bought and sold by Indians to non-Indi-
ans on Indian lands." Hayden-Cartwright provides this power. Congress has
not repealed the law. Rather, it re-enacted the legislation after the executive
agencies charged with interpreting and applying the law contemporaneously
interpreted the Act broadly. The legislative history underscores that Congress
intended that States be able to tax on "military or other reservations"' be-
cause it was in a partnership with the states to build and maintain the roads
necessary for economic development. That reason remains. To decide otherwise
will weaken the transportation infrastructure and cripple the state side of the na-
tional marriage.
Charles K. Bloeser
209. Letter from U.S. Congressman Steve Largent to author (October 24, 1995) (on file with author).
210. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
211. H.R. Rep. No. 2902, at 2 (1936).
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